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9 Varieties and Complexities of Doctrinal Change: 
Historical Commentary, 1901-1945 
Edward A. Purcell, Jr.* 
The preceding three fine chapters in Part III not only advance our understanding of 
international law developments in the United States but also suggest the challenges that 
confront scholars in the field. Although focused on the Supreme Court, they nonetheless 
suggest the sprawling scope of their subject and the complex interrelationships - institu- 
tional, intellectual, cultural, economic, and political - that often entangle and perplex 
both legal and historical analysis. By carefully identifying central issues and tracing 
lllajor developments, the chapters illuminate the past and suggest important directions 
for future scholarship. 
This review chapter proceeds in four parts. The first three examine the contributions 
of the chapters in this section, while the fourth explores three basic themes that nm 
through much of the book. Those themes are hardly the only ones that merit discussion, 
but each seems central to the history of international law in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. 
I. The Law of Treaties 
Professor Michael Van Alstine's essay introduces the period from 1901 to 1945 as one of 
paradox. Although vast social and political forces "propelled a substantial change in the 
domestic law," he explains, the law of treaties was marked "not by headstrong change, but 
rather by a sense of continuity, consolidation, and completion." While the numbers and 
types of treaties expanded rapidly in the early twentieth century, the Court "repeatedly 
reaffirmed the foundational principles of treaty law," including the duty of courts to apply 
treaties as controlling law, the "last-in-time" rule, the law of territorial acquisition, and 
the right of the President to determine the nation's treaty partners.1 
The period's "most distinctive feature" was "the Court's distillation of a largely com- 
plete and broadly coherent system of treaty interpretation." The essential elements 
*Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor, New York Law School. The author wishes to thank New York 
Law School students Stephanie Gibbs, Jared Kagan, Sarah Mirsky, and Ann Young for their invaluable 
assistance and Michael McCarthy of the New York Law School Library for his help in tracking down 
hard-to-find source materials. 
1 
Chapter 6, pp. 192-93. 
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of that system were "a purposive approach" to interpretation intended "to advance 
amicable relations" with the nation's treaty partners and a "presumption in favor of 
a liberal recognition of individual rights secured by treaties."2 The Court established the 
law of contracts as interpreted in international law as its "fundamental model for treaty 
interpretation," laid firm foundations for "three of the established pillars of modern treaty 
interpretation," and developed other doctrines to implement its "substantive preference 
for enlarging individual treaty rights."3 
Conversely, the Court gave little attention -and less effect- to the distinction between 
treaties that were "self-executing" and those that required congressional action to give 
them domestic effect,4 and it saw relatively little need to defer to the other branches of 
government in interpreting treaties. To the Congress, it gave no deference, although it 
recognized the Senate's power to ratify treaties subject to binding reservations as well 
as Congress's power to alter or abrogate treaties.5 To the executive branch, it gave only 
limited deference, and then not to its legal opinions but only to its actual and established 
practices in implementing treaty provisions." 
Most notably, Professor Van Alstine finds continuity in the Court's decision in Missouri 
v. Hollmzd,7 the period's "most famous treaty case." Although Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr.'s opinion seemed to give the treaty power an almost unlimited scope, Van 
Alstine argues that it "actually plowed very little new constitutional ground."8 Geofroy v. 
Riggs9 in 1890 "had already staked out a nearly unlimited substantive scope for the treaty 
power," and Neely v. Henke/IO in 1901 had held that Congress could pass substantive 
legislation on the basis of any valid treaty.!' 
While Professor Van Alstine uses Missouri v. Holland to highlight his continuity 
thesis, his claim may be overstated. First, the precedents he cites are distinguishable on 
the ground that they dealt with relatively traditional and inherently "international" affairs. 
Geofroy addressed the claims of French citizens residing in France to inherit property 
located in the District of Columbia, while Neely dealt with Congress's power to extradite 
individuals to Cuba. Missouri v. Holland, in contrast, addressed the control of migratory 
birds found within the United States, a subject that had commonly been considered 
a "local" matter within the police power of the States.12 Second, the precedents Van 
2 Id., pp. 193-94. Professor Duncan Hollis suggests the Court neither enforced individual treaty rights as 
consistently in the earlier period nor employed such a consistent interpretive method. See Chapter 2, 
pp. 66-72, 80-85. 
3 Chapter 6, pp. 209-10. 
4 Id., pp. 202-04. Professor Hollis supports Van Alstine's continuity thesis on this point. See Chapter 2, 
pp. 208-12. 
5 
Chapter 6, 206-08. In contrast, Professor Hollis argues that the Court gave considerable deference to 
congressional interpretations of treaties during the I 860-1900 period. See Chapter 2, pp. 83-84. 
6 
Chapter 6, 2 I 7-18. Chapter 2 suggests that the Court began to give some deference to the President in 
the late nineteenth century. See Chapter 2, pp. 84-85. In contrast, the Court gave "zero deference" to 
the Executive in the early nineteenth century. David Sloss, f udicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty 
Interpretations: A Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. Sunv, AM. L. 497, 499 (2007). 7 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
8 Chapter 6, p. I 99. 
9 133 U.S. 258 (1890). 
JO 180 U.S. 109 (1901). 
11 Chapter 6, pp. 198, 200. 
12 See G. Edward White, The Transfomiation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 67 (1999). 
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Alstine cites were, with one hardly relevant exception, 13 all handed down after 1890. 
Thus, they tell us little about Missouri v. Holland's continuity with the treaty law of 
most of the nineteenth century.14 Third, Van Alstine may give insufficient weight to the 
broader importance of Holmes's frequently cited language describing the Constitution 
as an "organism" whose meaning property evolves with the nation's development.15 By 
itself, that language gave the Court's opinion a deep resonance that carried far beyond 
the realm of treaty law. 
Moreover, as Professor Van Alstine himself points out, there was something new about 
Missouri v. Holland. Challenging the statute based on the treaty, Missouri argued that 
Congress could not use the treaty power as a basis for legislation that invaded the rights 
of the States under the Tenth Amendment.16 In response, the Court ruled that the 
amendment was irrelevant because the treaty power under Article II, Section 2, was a 
legislative power "delegated expressly" to the national government.17 Together with its 
holding that the treaty power authorized the federal government to regulate migratory 
birds, a traditionally local matter, the Court's treatment of the Tenth Amendment laid 
to rest a longstanding States' rights claim and constituted a notable break with the past. 
As C. Edward White has argued, Missouri v. Holland was a critical part of the "trans- 
formation" in the constitutional law of foreign relations that occurred between the late 
nineteenth century and the I 930s.18 
Finally, the period witnessed the expansion and escalating use of sole executive agree- 
ments, a development that Professor Van Alstine identifies as the period's "starkest exam- 
ple of change," one that was "perhaps even revolutionary."19 United States v. Curtiss- 
Wright Export Corp.20 claimed far-reaching foreign relations powers for the President in 
language suggesting that those powers were virtually unbounded, and United States v. 
Belmont21 and United States v. Pink22 seemed "to hold that an executive agreement may 
13 The exception, Americun Insurance Co. v. 356 Bu/es of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511 ( 1828), affirmed only that the 
United States could acquire territory by way of treaty, a far narrower and less controversial holding than 
14 the one in Missouri v. Ho/fond. 
15 Accord Chapter 2, pp. 85-87. IC. Chapter 6, p. 201 (citing Ho/fond, 252 U.S. at 433). 
Professor Van Alstine underscores the importance of Missouri v. Ho/fond by noting that the States' rights 
argument Missouri advanced had its "foundation" in Geofroy v, Riggs, 13 3 U.S. at 267 - the very case he 
identifies as having established a "nearly unlimited" treaty power. Chapter 6, p. 198. In fact, the scope of 
the treaty power was hotly contested in the early twentieth century. See, e.g., HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 
LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 140-41 
(1915). See generally David M. Golove, Treaty Muking and the Nution: The Historical Foundations of the 
17 
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 M1cH. L. REv. 1075, 1238-57 (2000). 
18 
252 U.S. at 432. 
See White, supra note 12, at 72-73. For a different view supporting Van Alstine's claim of continuity, see 
19 
Charles A. Lofgren, Missouri v. Holland in Historical Perspective, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 102-03. 
Chapter 6, p. 218; accord White, supra note 12, at 146; see also Evan Criddle, The Viemw Convention 
on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. lNT'L L. 431, 467-73 (2004) (arguing that 
strong deference to the President in treaty interpretation developed in the 1920s and 1930s). The shift in 
the balance between treaties and executive agreements (with or without congressional approval) began in 
the half-century before World War II when the nation entered 524 treaties and 917 executive agreements. 
Oona Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of lniemational Lawmaking in the United 
20 States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1287 (2008). 
21 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
22 
301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
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preempt any and all state laws by presidential fiat."23 Together, he concludes, those cases 
created "a seemingly unlimited field for unilateral executive control over our country's 
foreign affairs."24 
While Professor Van Alstine's continuity thesis requires qualification, it serves nicely 
to highlight another fundamental point he makes: that far more substantial changes in 
treaty law came in the century's second half. Then, the Court's commitment to both a 
"purposive approach" to treaty interpretation and a "liberal recognition" of individual 
treaty rights largely disappeared,25 while the Justices showed increasing deference to the 
political branches and turned the concept of "non-self-executing" treaties into a major 
obstacle to judicial enforcement of treaty obligations -, The nature and sweep of those 
later changes, Van Alstine implies, dwarfed earlier changes and consequently made the 
century's first half seem, relatively speaking, a period of continuity. 
Perhaps Professor Van Alstine's most important contribution is to illustrate the way 
that the meaning and significance of constitutional principles change over time. During 
the nineteenth century the principle of separation of powers was understood to mean that 
the President and two-thirds of the Senate - the constitutionally defined "lawmaking" 
authority for treaties - had the power to "make" treaties, while the Court had the 
quintessential judicial function of construing and applying those treaties. Recognizing its 
"special responsibility" under the Supremacy Clause to ensure that treaties were honored, 
the Court served as "a faithful constitutional agent in the enforcement of international 
commitments in domestic law."26 During the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
however, massive changes in the United States and its role in an internationalizing world 
brought pressures that gradually altered the operation of those principles.27 The power 
of the President and the Senate to "make" treaties remained, but it was employed less 
and less frequently as alternate methods of effecting international agreements proved 
quicker and easier to use. Gradually, the Court accepted the principle that the President 
together with simple majorities in both Houses of Congress could make international 
agreements that were the legal equivalents of treaties and, further, that the President 
alone could also make international agreements that were, at least in many ways, the 
legal equivalents of treaties. In addition, mostly after World War II, the Court changed 
its own role in two ways. First, it came to accept the idea that many treaties were, for 
one reason or another, "non-self-executing" and hence that it should not enforce them 
without further authorization from Congress. Second, it came to accept the idea that 
executive branch legal opinions, even if unprecedented or unmoored in prior practice, 
might properly influence or perhaps even determine how the Court should construe and 
apply treaties and other international agreements.28 Together, those changes meant that 
23 Chapter 6, p. 223. More than sixty years after Pink the Court decided Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 
(2008), which casts doubt on the more aggressive interpretations of Pink. 
24 Chapter 6, p. 224. 
25 Professor Hollis supports Van Alstine's point about continuity on this issue, suggesting that in the earlier 
period there was "a presumption in favor of treaties as federal law vis-a-vis individuals unless something 
in the treaty or a federal statute suggested otherwise." Chapter 2, p. 67. But see id., pp. 69-71 (discussing 
exceptions that limited the "presumption"). 
26 Chapter 6, p. 202; see also Chapter 1, pp. 13-23; Chapter 4, pp. 133-41. 
27 The impact of those changed conditions is a major theme in Professor Paul Stephan's chapter. See 
Chapter 10. 
28 ld., pp. 322-26 (increased reluctance to enforce treaties without congressional legislation); id., pp. 3 35-38 
(increased deference to views of Executive). 
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the Court's enforcement of treaties became more dependent on Congress and, to some 
uncertain but growing extent, on the President as well. 
Those developments significantly realigned the relationships among the federal 
branches. The President was greatly enhanced; the House granted new authority; the 
Senate partially eclipsed; the Court more narrowly constrained; and Congress as a whole 
strengthened with respect to the Court but weakened with respect to the President. The 
principle of separation of powers remained as a fundamental constitutional concept, but 
its meaning and operation had been substantially altered. 
II. Customary International Law 
In contrast to Van Alstine, Professor Michael Ramsey stresses change, identifying not only 
a variety of shifts in the Court's jurisprudence but also a "revolution" in its understanding 
of the nature of law that came with Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins in 1938.29 Indeed, he 
rnaintains, the "story of the Supreme Court and international law in the early twentieth 
century" is "to a large extent a story about Erie."30 Accordingly, he breaks his chapter 
into pre- and post-Erie eras. 
Professor Ramsey organizes the pre-Erie section around three themes: the sharpening 
conflict over the doctrine of "general" law, the waning role of customary international 
law as a direct source of legal rules, and a decline in "international law positivism." 
Examining the first trend, he notes that customary international law became increasingly 
understood as a component of "general" law and that its merger into the latter eventually 
brought the most striking doctrinal results in admiralty suits and suits between States.31 
Accordingly, he focuses on the Court's critical decisions in Southern Pacific Co. v. 
Jensen32 and Kansas v. Colorado33 to show how the Justices used the resulting blend 
to create a new and specifically "federal" law in those two areas. Outside admiralty 
and interstate disputes, however, customary internationa'l law remained an imprecisely 
defined element of "general" law and, consequently, not authentically "federal" within 
the meaning of either the Supremacy Clause or federal jurisdictional statutes. 
The other two themes in the first section, the declining influence of customary inter- 
national law and its positivist method, are less central to Professor Ramsey's broader argu- 
rnent about Erie. In part, their decline was due to the proliferation of statutes and treaties 
that displaced many customary international law rules and to the de facto disappearance 
of many traditional customary international law staples, such as cases involving privateers 
and prizes. The decline was also caused by the merging of customary international law 
into "general" law. The merger obscured the distinctive role of customary international 
law while making its positivist method unnecessary.i" Because "general" law was based 
not on state consent and practice but on principles of reason and morality, the merger 
of customary international law into "general" law meant that American courts would 
look to those principles, not to state behavior, to determine customary international 
29 
30 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
31 Chapter 7, p. 225. • 
32 Id., pp. 227-34. 
33 244 U.S. 205 (1917). 185 U.S. 125 (1902) (announcing, inter alia, that the Court would consult international law in deciding 
34 
merits); 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (deciding merits). 
Chapter 7, pp. 235-38. 
290 International Law in the U.S. Supreme Court 
law's content.35 Finally, Ramsey suggests, the decline of customary international law 
was caused by the partial constitutionalization of two of its important subfields: con- 
flict of laws and personal jurisdiction over nonresidents and noncitizens. 36 By extending 
constitutional mandates into those areas, the Court further narrowed the role that cus- 
tomary international law would play in its jurisprudence. 
Rounding out the first section, Professor Ramsey addresses the relationship between 
international law and American foreign policy. While the period's cases were for the most 
part "not rnomentous,"37 he identifies one major exception-Curtiss-Wright-a dubiously 
reasoned case38 that would become "a standard citation" for those who sought to justify 
an "effectively unconstrained executive foreign affairs power."39 Ramsey, however, points 
out that the Court's opinion in Curtiss-Wright not only contained language supporting 
such an "unconstrained" view of presidential power but also included language pushing 
in the opposite direction. The opinion explicitly states that the President is limited "by 
treaties, international understandings and compacts, and the principles of international 
law."40 Thus, even with its broadest reading, Ramsey suggests, the case does not authorize 
unlimited executive power over foreign affairs. Rather, it proposes "a tradeoff": executive 
power is freed from constitutional fetters but cabined by international law.41 
Unfortunately, if Curtiss-Wright were accepted on that theory, the tracleoff would 
likely impose few if any significant restraints on the President. It would squarely put 
a question that has become increasingly important during the twentieth century: does 
the President have the right to violate international law? It seems highly doubtful that 
a future Court would ever, in a significant showdown, give anything but an affirmative 
answer to that question.42 If the President is to be constrained by law in the conduct of 
foreign affairs, it seems likely that only domestic authorities - constitutional barriers or 
explicit congressional statutes - would serve.43 
In the second part of his chapter Professor Ramsey addresses Erie and the problem it 
generated for customary international law. Overruling a century of the Court's jurispru- 
dence, Justice Louis D. Brandeis's majority opinion held that there was no such thing as 
"general" law and announced that the Court's prior decisions enforcing such law repre- 
sented "an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the courts of the United States."44 
35 Professor David Bederman notes that in discussing customary international law issues the Court was 
often "vague," referred to "general" legal sources and principles, and used little direct evidence of actual 
state practice. Chapter 3, pp. 103-12. Its treatment of customary international law as "general" law, he 
concludes, was not consistent. Id., pp. 114-17. 
3ci Chapter 7, pp. 23 5-36. 
37 Id., p. 240. 
38 See, e.g., Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassess· 
ment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 32 (1973) (historical basis is "shockingly inaccurate"); David M. Levitan, The Foreign 
Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 497 (1946) (makes "a 
shambles" of the idea of constitutional government). 
39 Chapter 7, p. 243. 
40 Id., p. 242 (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318). 
41 Id. 
42 Accord Chapter 3, pp. 120-22. 
43 On the challenge of constraining executive foreign relations powers by law, see, e.g., David). Barron & 
Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and 
Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008). 
44 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938). 
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It declared that the word "laws" included only those rules - whether made by judges 
or legislatures - that a sovereign power would enforce, and it announced a basic con- 
stitutional principle: "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by 
acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state."45 Thus, 
Erie implicitly posed a major question: if "general" law does not properly exist and all 
legitimate domestic law is either "state" or "federal," what is customary international 
law? 
In a valuable summary, Professor Ramsey evaluates the three basic approaches to 
the problem that scholars and judges have offered, noting strengths and weaknesses in 
each.46 In the years after World War II most commentators regarded Erie as essentially 
irrelevant to issues of international law and accepted the proposition that customary 
international law was a form of federal law.47 Recent critics, however, have advanced 
alternative positions based on broader readings of Erie. Some argue that, because cus- 
tomary international law is authorized by neither the Constitution nor congressional 
statutes, Erie means that customary international law cannot be federal law and must 
therefore be state law.48 Others, relying on the federal nature of foreign relations law and 
the Court's acceptance of a "special" federal common law, argue that Erie means that 
customary international law may be federal law in some areas but state law in others.49 
Ramsey concludes quite accurately that none of the proposed solutions "was wholly 
embraced, nor wholly rejected, in Erie's time" and that none is "wholly satisfactory.T'' 
The fundamental problem, as Professor William Dodge writes later in this volume in 
Chapter 11, is that Erie constituted such a profound jurisprudential change that many 
questions involving its significance for customary international law "would have made 
no sense before 1938."51 
45 
4G Id. at 78. ' Professor Bederman points out that the Court's decisions in the late nineteenth century were "ambiguous 
in answering the question whether a norm of customary international law or general maritime law was one 
of federal law for purposes of the Constitution's Article III (conveying federal jurisdiction) or Article VI 
(preempting state law)." Chapter 3, p. 117. He concludes that the Court established that customary 
international law was not "federal" law for statutory jurisdictional purposes but that its "substantive status" 
47 
as federal or state law nonetheless "remained indeterminate." Id., p. 119. 
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES s 3 Reporters' 
Note 2 (1965); RESTATEMENT (Tumo) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES s 111 
48 Reporters' Note 3 (1987). See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary lniemaiional Law as Federal Common Law: A 
Critique of the Modem Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of Customary 
International Law in U.S. Courts Before and After Erie, 26 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 807 (1998). For 
responses arguing that customary international law is federal law, see Harold Hongj u Koh, Is International 
Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About 
Customary lnternatlonal Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 
49 (1997). 
E.g., Ernest A. Young, Sorting out the Debate over Customary international Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365 
(2002); G. Edward White, A Customal)' International Law of Torts, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 755 (2006); 
William S. Dodge, Bridging Erie: Customary lniemational Law in the U.S. Legal System After Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain, IQ. TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 87 (2004). Bradley and Goldsmith note that their 
interpretation would leave some areas of foreign relations law unaffected. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra 
50 note 48, at 870-75. 
51 Chapter 7, p. 254. Chapter 11, p. 375; see also Part V.B. 
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Considering Erie's relevance for customary international law, four general conclusions 
seem warranted. First, then-Professor Philip C. Jessup was almost certainly right when he 
opined the year after Erie came clown that "Mr. Justice Brandeis was surely not thinking 
of international law" when he wrote his opinion.52 Neither the specific facts of the case, 
which involved a single individual injured by a passing train in a small Pennsylvania 
town, nor the broader social, political, and constitutional factors that concerned Brandeis 
and the Court at the time had any direct connection with customary international law. 
Incleecl, as Ramsey points out, when the Court cleciclecl Erie, it "had not cleciclecl a pure 
direct-application international law case for over twenty years."53 The Erie/customary 
international law problem, in other words, was apparently entirely absent from the 
Justices' minds. 
Textual evidence supports that conclusion, for the Court's constitutional reasoning 
contained a glaring and otherwise inexplicable error. Announcing that state law con- 
trolled except "in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress," 
the opinion left out treaties, a category of luw that the Constitution explicitly makes 
"supreme.T" Neither Brandeis nor any other Justice would have denied that status. 
Indeed, Brandeis had joined the Court's opinion in Missouri v. Holland, which recog- 
nized the sweeping scope of the federal treaty power. Thus, Erie's omission of treaties 
could only have been clue to inadvertence, to the fact that none of the Justices was 
thinking about the opinion's relevance for international law issues.55 
Second, and equally obvious from the opinion's text, Erie was focused on four other 
quite different problems. One was the doctrinal confusion that the vague idea of "general" 
law caused and the "well of uucertainties'v" it created about when and under what 
circumstances federal courts would follow decisions of state courts. A second was the 
fact that "general" law combined with federal jurisdictional and procedural rules to spur 
forum shopping and aggressive litigation tactics that burdened the courts and created 
inefficiencies in the legal system. A third was the unfairness that those aggressive litigation 
tactics imposed on relatively weak individual claimants, especially when they faced 
sophisticated corporate adversaries able to exploit their systemic advantages. The last, and 
most fundamental, was that "general" law had developed into a doctrine that allowed the 
federal courts to create rules of non-constitutional national law that were "confessedly" 
beyond the power of Congress to alter,57 a doctrine that contradicted the fundamental 
52 Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 740, 743 ( 1939). Indicative of the profession's inattention to the Erie/customary international law 
question at the time, [essup's article was almost alone in discussing the problem, and it was exceptionally 
brief, covering less than three full printed pages. 
53 Chapter 7, p. 246. The Court itself subsequently distinguished Erie on the ground that Jessup suggested 
when it ruled that the act of state doctrine "must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law." Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964); see Chapter 11, pp. 262-63. 
54 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
55 Although Brandeis had strong international interests, especially in Jewish affairs in Palestine and in the 
events surrounding World War I and the coming of World War II, his professional focus remained on 
domestic issues. Indeed, his Zionism was largely shaped by his commitment to American ideals and 
Progressive values. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, Lours D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 405-09 (2009). "Brandeis was too 
deeply immersed in American domestic problems to give foreign affairs much attention." ALPHEUS THOMAS 
MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 438 (1946). 
56 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938). 
57 Id. at 72. 
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constitutional principle of legislative primacy.58 No hint of international law figured in 
Erie's discussion of any of those concerns.59 
Third, had Brandeis actually considered the customary international law question, his 
constitutional jurisprudence suggests that he would likely have denied from the start that 
it required an "either/or" solution. As a geileral matter, Brandeis sought to give full scope 
to federal authority while ensuring that the States retained an important role when federal 
control was not necessary. However, when national action was called for, Brandeis had 
no qualms about upholding federal nnthority.P" In Commerce Clause cases, for example, 
he sought "to treat the constitutional power of interstate commerce as very broad" but 
also "to treat acts of Congress as not invading State power unless it clearly appeared 
that the federal power was intended to be exercised exclusively."61 Similarly, he joined 
Justice George Sutherland's opinion in Curtiss-Wright extending presidential power in 
the realm of foreign affairs, but the next year he refused to join Sutherland's follow-up 
opinion in Belmont that upheld a sole executive agreement and contained sweeping 
dicta about presidential power to override state law.62 Instead, Brandeis joined Justice 
Harlan F. Stone's concurrence, which identified narrower grounds for the decision 
and emphasized that state law remained controlling in areas related to the executive 
agreement.63 
Both the admiralty and interstate dispute cases support the same conclusion. ,In the 
former, Brandeis had no problem, as a general matter, with national authority over 
maritime law. His objections to Jensen were based on quite different grounds. He 
thought that the Court unnecessarily set aside state workers' compensation laws that, 
in his mind, were of the greatest social importance and that its decision was based 
on an alleged need for "uniformity" in the absence of reasons why such uniformity 
Was necessary. His objections were further strengthened when the Court used Jensen 
to void two subsequent congressional statutes that authorized the application of state 
Workers' compensation laws in admiralty.64 Similarly, mid for obvious practical reasons, 
Brandeis had no objection to the assertion of national authority over disputes between 
States. His objection to the law in that area was based, instead, on his opposition to 
58 EDWARD A. PURCELL, )R., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE )UDICIAL POWER, 
59 AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA chs. 6 and 7 (2000). 
Professor Ramsey suggests that Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 ( 1941 ), provides further evidence that "the 
Court was not thinking clearly about Erie's relationship to international law." Chapter 7, p. 255. The 
Court's inattention was wholly understandable, for it had more than enough difficulty struggling to craft 
a coherent "Erie doctrine" in areas that the case directly implicated. PURCELL, supra note 58, at 201-28, 
(10 246-55, 276-78, 287-95. 
61 
PURCELL, supra note 58, at 150-53, 182-85. 
Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (June 17, 1923), in 5 LETTERS OF Louis BRANDEIS 78 
(Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1978); see, e.g., Ark. R.R. Conun'n v. Chicago, Rock Island & 
Pac. R.R. Co., 274 U.S. 597 (1927) (Brandeis,).); N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 154 (1917) 
62 (Brandeis, J ., dissenting). Brandeis also sought to limit presidential power in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 240 (1926) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting), where, framing the issue far more narrowly than did the majority opinion, he 
would have upheld congressional power to limit the President's authority to remove federal officers. Nine 
years later he joined the' Court in distinguishing Myers and restricting the President's removal power. 
63 
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
64 
301 U.S. 324, 333 (1937) (Stone, J., concurring, joined by Brandeis and Cardozo, JJ.). 
PURCELL, supra note 58, at 175-77. [ensen was also less offensive to Brandeis than was the broader "general" 
law, for in admiralty the Court recognized the authority of Congress to override at least some parts of the 
judge-made maritime law. Id. at 177. 
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the sweeping constitutional theory that Justice David J. Brewer set out in Kansas v. 
Colorado, the leading opinion in the field.65 Brewer Ii.ad used the Tenth Amendment 
to expand the federal judicial power beyond the reach of the legislative powers of both 
Congress and the States, and Brandeis responded to Brewer in Hindetluler v. La Plata 
River 6 Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,66 handed down the same day the Court announced 
its opinion in Erie. There, Brandeis readily approved federal authority over interstate 
disputes but explicitly rejected Brewer's theory of sweeping and exclusive federal judicial 
power.i" 
Thus, had Brandeis thought about the customary international law question, it seems 
likely that he would have denied that Erie required a single comprehensive answer and 
would have urged the Court to consider instead the practical reasons for categorizing 
any particular element of customary international law as either "federal" or "state." He 
would likely have scrutinized the contexts in which each issue appeared, examined 
the various interests at stake, and estimated the likely consequences of applying one or 
the other label. He would, in other words, have searched for a socially convenient and 
institutionally balanced resolution for each different issue presented. 
Finally, insofar as the Court's opinion in Erie offers any authentically rooted guidance 
on the customary international law problem, that guidance should come not from the 
opinion's terse language that can be read to suggest an "either/or" requirement but rather 
from the four substantive concerns that actually shaped its analysis.68 Erie directs us to 
consider which categorization of customary international law would be more likely to 
create legal uncertainties, which more likely to produce systemic inefficiencies, which 
to disadvantage ordinary individuals litigating against resource-laden adversaries.i" and 
which to honor relevant legislative policies and ensure ultimate legislative authority.i'' 
Examining the Erie/customary international law problem by considering those four 
concerns would hardly resolve every relevant issue, but it would at least shape an approach 
that was substantially related to the actual concerns and reasoning that underlay the 
Court's opinion. That seems preferable to ignoring the fact that Erie gave no heed to cus- 
tomary international law issues and arbitrarily elevating it into an authority that compels a 
(ii During the 1930s the Court cited Brewer's opinion a dozen times, sometimes in cases outside the area 
of interstate disputes, and relied on it to support the proposition that an "interstate common law" existed 
and that the Court could make law where neither Congress nor state legislatures could do so. See Cal. Or. 
Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-64 (1935); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 
282 U.S. 660, 670-71 (1931). The Court also cited Brewer's opinion in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 
U.S. 238, 293-94 (1936), where Brandeis dissented (along with Hughes, Stone, and Cardozo). 
c,c, 304 U.S. 92 (1938). 
67 PURCELL, supra note 58, at 57-60, 186-190. 
c,s For a different consideration of the "values" of Erie and the customary international law problem, see 
Young, supra note 49, at 394-404. 
m The "social" aspect of Erie has been essentially lost, although it echoes faintly in the "inequitable admin- 
istration of the law" language of Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 ( 1965). It would seem to carry no 
weight with the contemporary Supreme Court. See PURCELL, supra note 58, at 290-92, 296-97. 
711 For example, in Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185 (I 918), the Court construed LaFollette's Seaman's 
Act, 38 Stat. 1164, narrowly to preclude a seaman's recovery. The majority reasoned that Congress did 
not clearly intend a broader application of the statute that would contradict the territoriality principle. 
Id. at 195-96. Brandeis joined Justice Joseph McKenna's dissent (along with Justices Holmes and John 
Clarke), which argued that congressional policy required giving the statute a broader application and 
that congressional policy should trump the principle of territoriality and other such international law 
considerations. Id. at 201-05. 
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sweeping and categorical "either/or" answer to what is, after all, a historically incoherent 
question. Insofar as Erie created a meaningful problem for customary international law, 
it is not one oflogically necessary categorization but of wise practical judgment. 
III. International Law as an Interpretive Tool 
Professor Roger Alford also highlights changes that occurred during the period, but 
he sounds a distinctly different note in warning about the potential dangers of using 
international law as an interpretive tool. He wisely reminds us that international law - 
like most other legal sources - can be used to support a wide range of social and political 
policies. During the first half of the twentieth century, he stresses, international law did 
not concern itself with "human rights" but instead focused "exclusively" on matters of 
"external" sovereignty, that is, on the rights and powers of nations in dealing with other 
nations. That focus underwrote "an expansive understanding of sovereignty that imposes 
few limits on the exercise of government power." Thus, he concludes, "the recurring 
theme during this period is that customary international law supports government action 
rather than curtails it."71 
With respect to statutory construction, Professor Alford identifies international law's 
principal function as limiting the extraterritorial reach of federal law on the basis of its 
concept of sovereignty.72 His story of that function is one of decline. In 1909 Justice 
Holmes adopted a "strict" territorial theory of national sovereignty in American Banana 
Co. v. United Fruit Co. 73 and ruled that federal statutes presumptively applied only inside 
American territory. Within only a few years, however, the Court began edging away from 
that doctrine, and in 1945 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America74 sounded its 
"death knell."75 Ushering in an "effects doctrine," Alcoa ruled that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality could readily be overcome by harm caused within the United 
States, the intent of Congress, or general concerns of international comity.76 
Professor Alford's emphasis on American Banana's "strict" territoriality theory and 
its subsequent decline seems somewhat misleading. As Professors Thomas Lee and 
David Sloss show in Chapter 4, the territorial principle was well established by the 
111id-11ineteenth century, although it recognized certain exceptions that Holmes himself 
acknowledged in his opinion.77 Similarly, as Professor Melissa Waters shows in Chapter 
12, the Court continued to honor the territoriality principle after 1945, limiting the 
extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws in both maritime and non-maritime cases.78 Professor 
Paul Stephan, moreover, finds in Chapter 10 that in the later period the Court often used 
treaties to accomplish the same limiting result.79 Thus, territoriality was, and remained, a 
111ajor principle in American jurisprudence both before and after American Banana, and 
71 
72 Chapter 8, p. 257. 
73 Id., pp. 258-59. 
74 
213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
75 
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
76 Chapter 8, p. 265. 
77 Id., p. 269. See Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 355-56. Professors Lee and Sloss note the importance of territoriality for 
certain constitutional issues, while Professor Bederman notes its importance in customary international 
78 
law issues. See Chapter 4, pp. 148-52; Chapter 3, pp. 100-03. 
79 Chapter 12, pp. 381-93. 
Chapter I 0, p. 3 30. 
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the Court's long-term practice was more nuanced than any theory of "strict" territoriality 
or any story of its straightforward decline would admit. Indeed, American Banana's great- 
est long-term significance may lie elsewhere - not in its use of rigid ideas of sovereignty 
and territoriality but in its reliance on more flexible ideas of comity and conflict of laws 
principles in addressing questions of extraterritoriality.r'' 
Intriguingly, Professor Alford suggests a plausible reason why the Court might have 
advanced such an ostensibly strict territorial theory in American Banana. Rather than 
being persuaded to adopt one of Holmes's pet positivist ideas, the Justices may have 
seized on territoriality as a serviceable method of dealing with an awkward diplomatic 
problem. A "finding against United Fruit would cast judgment on sovereign malfea- 
sance," Alford comments, and adoption of strict territoriality may have reflected "the 
Court's desire to avoid sitting in judgment on the acts of another sovereign."81 Thus, 
American Banana's seeming embrace of strict territoriality may have been little more 
than a tactical expeclient.82 
With respect to the Constitution, Professor Alford's discussion is more complex and 
provocative. Examining four areas involving individual rights, he emphasizes the central 
role that the concept of sovereignty played and argues that international law served "to 
enhance government power."83 In three of the four areas his argument is persuasive. First, 
the Court used the laws of war to restrict the constitutional rights of individuals, limiting 
the applicability of the Fifth Amendment in wartime and sanctioning harsh punitive 
measures that would otherwise violate the Constitution.84 Second, the Court drew on 
ideas of sovereignty in Curtiss-Wright to provide a new vision of constitutional authority 
that justified sweeping presidential power over foreign affairs and seemed to exclude 
Congress entirely from the area.85 However one might construe Curtiss-Wright, Alford 
suggests, international law provided a critical part of its reasoning and was used to justify a 
substantial expansion of presidential power.86 Third, considering the constitutional status 
of the territories the United States acquired at the encl of the nineteenth century, the Insu- 
lar Cases87 drew on international law to establish the nation's right of possession and to 
explain the new distinction it drew between "incorporated" and "unincorporated" territo- 
ries. The former were territories that were fully a part of the United States, while the latter 
80 Professor Alford suggests this last point. See Chapter 8, p. 260; see also Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: 
Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 SuP. CT. REV. 179, 186; William S. Dodge, Extrater- 
ritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. JOI, 
121-27 (1998). 
81 Chapter 8, p. 262. 
82 Professor Alford points out that Holmes subsequently joined a unanimous Court in "distinguishing'.' 
American Banana and giving the Sherman Antitrust Act extraterritorial application in United States v. 
Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). See Chapter 8, pp. 264-65. 
83 Chapter 8, p. 169. 
8~ Id., pp. 275-78; accord Chapter 4, pp. 142-47. 
8' Chapter 8, pp. 279-83. Curtiss-Wright was written by Justice George Sutherland, who had been developing 
his theory of executive foreign affairs powers for two decades and who in 1918 termed it "an entirely new 
theory of the Constitution," id., p. 280 (quoting Sutherland)- a revealing statement from the Justice who 
would subsequently write his views into law while defending them on historical grounds. 
sr, As discussed supra p. 290, Professor Ramsey offers a somewhat different interpretation. See Chapter 7, 
p. 242. 
87 There were more than two dozen so-called Insular Cases decided between 190 I and the 1920s. Among 
the key early decisions were Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Dorr v, United States, 195 U.S. 
138 (1904); and Rassmussen v, United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905). See BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, THE 
INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (2006). 
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were merely external possessions that the United States controlled. In incorporated terri- 
tories the Constitution applied fully, while in unincorporated territories it did not. Thus, 
the Insular Cases gave Congress plenary authority over the latter - subject only to vague 
and unspecified "fundamental" limitations "inherent" in principles of free government.88 
Although Alford refers to the Court's territorial "incorporation" doctrine as "natural 
law constitutionalism,"89 it might more appropriately be termed "managerial constitu- 
tionalism." That is, while the Insular Cases employed a vague language of unspecified 
«c fundamental" rights, the distinction between "incorporated" and "unincorporated" ter- 
ritories served an immediate and intensely practical administrative function. It drew a 
bright line dividing the nation's territorial possessions based on their de facto politi- 
cal "desirability" as potential new States, an instrumentalist divide that was strategically 
shrewd in both military and economic terms and highly popular in culturally and racially 
exclusionary terms.9° The new doctrine of "unincorporated" territories authorized the 
political branches to administer the disfavored new possessions in whatever manner they 
wished, unencumbered by significant constitutional restrictions.91 It maintained the 
Court's position as the ultimate constitutional authority while, in practice, allowing pop- 
ular opinion to have its sway and the political branches to exercise nearly unhampered 
administrative control. 
While developments in those three areas support Professor Alford's argument that 
international law served to strengthen government power and weaken the rights of indi- 
viduals, the fourth area he discusses does not fit that pattern quite so snugly: In a par- 
ticularly insightful section, he emphasizes the often ignored international aspects of two 
familiar developments: acceptance of the "Brandeis Brief" and debate over the "incorpo- 
ration" of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause. In both, Alford points out, the 
Court consulted foreign sources by adopting methods of constitutional comparativism.92 
The Brandeis Brief involved not just social facts but social facts drawn from sixty years 
of experience "in the leading countries of Europe."93 Similarly, modern Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporation doctrine was rooted in the idea that due process embodied 
"certain immutable principles of justice" and that its content was to be found in "the 
jurisprudence of civilized and free countries."94 
Those developments, however, do not give unalloyed support to Professor Alford's 
broader thesis. True, in both areas "constitutional comparativism" was used to strengthen 
government and limit individual rights. The Brandeis Brief justified expanded state power 
and restricted employers' rights, while the jurisprudence of "civilized and free countries" 
served as a norm that initially blocked incorporation and cabined the meaning of due 
process. At the same time, however, the former was also used to create important new 
legal rights and remedies for women and then for workers generally, while the latter 
88 
89 
Chapter 8, p. 272 (quoting Downes, 182 U.S. at 290-91 (White, J., concurring)). 
90 Id. 
On the pervasive racism that urged sharp limits on American territorial annexations, see ERIC T. L. Lovs, 
91 
RACE OVER EMPIRE: RACISM AND U.S. IMPERIALISM, 1865-1900 (2004). 
The distinction also avoided the potentially troublesome language of In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891), 
which stated that the "Constitution can have no operation in another country." The Insular Cases made it 
clear that an unincorporated territory, although not a "part" of the United States, was nonetheless officially 
92 
a U.S. possession and not "another country." 
93 Chapter 8, pp. 272-75. Id., p. 272 (quoting the Brief for the State of Oregon submitted by Louis D. Brandeis in Muller v. Oregon, 
94 208 U.S. 412 (1908)). Id., pp. 273-74 (quoting Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 100-01, 113 (1908)). 
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eventually led to broadening views of individual rights and, beginning tentatively with 
the First Amendment in the 1920s, to the eventual, if selective, incorporation of most of 
the Bill of Rights. 
Professor Alford's broader thesis should also be qualified in another respect. When the 
Court construed treaties during this period, it often did so to protect individual rights. As 
Professor Van Alstine tells us, the Court transformed its interpretative canon requiring 
liberal construction into a "formal presumption in favor of recognizing individual rights 
secured by treaties."95 That presumption, the Court announced proudly in 193 3, had 
been "consistently recognized and applied by this Court."96 
Professor Alford closes his discussion by noting its bearing on contemporary debates 
over the use of foreign sources in constitutional interpretation. The approaches adopted 
in the Brandeis Brief and the incorporation debate, which he terms "pragmatic empiri- 
cism and natural law constitutionalism,"97 evidence a judicial practice of consulting 
foreign sources in constitutional cases. Because they "are not rooted in constitutional 
text and permit free-range harvesting of international best practices," they are "highly 
controversial methods for resolving constitutional questions."98 Still, Alford suggests, 
together they provide the "most coherent arguments for reliance on foreign or interna- 
tional law in constitutional interpretation."99 The two developments do provide clear 
historical precedents for such reliance, and they surely illustrate the complexity of Amer- 
ican legal development. Even granted their precedential relevance, however, they are 
only analogies with highly contestable elements and implications. Thus, they would 
seem to offer little prescriptive authority even to those who believe that international law 
norms should be relevant to constitutional questions.100 
IV. Three Central Themes 
The chapters in this book raise a wide range of issues that merit extended examination. 
Three seem particularly important for this period. 
A. The Pervasiveness of Change 
One of the most striking features of the chapters is their emphasis on change in the 
Court's international law jurisprudence. While the editors' introductory chapter stresses 
continuity in the Court's decisions from the late eighteenth century to the Civil War, 
the chapters covering later periods find considerably more change, not only in the 
95 Chapter 6, p. 213. 
96 Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293 (1933). Professor Van Alstine notes that the Court 
did not invariably enforce individual treaty rights. See Chapter 6, pp. 214-15. Professor Hollis also 
argues that in the late nineteenth century the Court frequently enforced certain kinds of individ- 
ual treaty rights although it refused to enforce others. See Chapter 2, pp. 66-72. After 1945, Van 
Alstine further suggests, the Court became increasingly reluctant to enforce individual treaty rights, 
a proposition with which Professor Stephan seems to agree. See Chapter 6, p. 215; Chapter JO, 
pp. 339-46. 
97 Chapter 8, p. 275. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
JOO For an elaborate treatment of the role of foreign and international law in constitutional interpretation, 
see VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA (2010). 
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Court's doctrines and interpretive techniques but also in its attitude toward interna- 
tional law and its own institutional role.101 Professor Hollis terms the decades after 
the Civil War "a period in flux,"102 while Professor Bedennan sees them bringing "a 
real revolution in understanding the nature of customary international law and its role 
in U.S. law."103 The disappearance of staple international law cases involving pirates, 
prizes, and privateers reoriented the Court's docket, drastically shrank its opportuni- 
ties to address customary international law issues, and accelerated its intensifying focus 
on domestic law sources, especially the Constitution. Further, the expansion of inter- 
state and international commerce and the rise of the regulatory state forced to the 
fore complex new problems involving personal jurisdiction, conflict of laws, and the 
extraterritorial reach of both state and federal laws. The conditions and challenges that 
shaped the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries differed so substantially from those 
that marked the twentieth century, Professor Stephan concludes, the Court's treaty 
decisions in the later period in effect changed "what it meant to be the law of the 
land."104 _ 
Perhaps the most fundamental change the chapters chart is the long-recognized shift 
in power in foreign relations law from Congress and the courts to the executive branch.105 
Thus, the chapters make it clear that current foreign relations law does not represent 
"original" or "traditional" constitutional doctrine. Before 1860, "the Court gave no def- 
erence to the executive branch's position on treaty interpretation questions," the editors 
note, and the U.S. government prevailed in only three of the Court's nineteen treaty cases 
in which it was a party during that early period.106 After 1860, as both Professors Hollis 
and Van Alstine show, the Court began to give increasing deference to the President, 1U7 
and the latter author also identifies a pivotal change in the grounds on which the Court 
based its deference. Into the early decades of the twentieth century, Van Alstine explains, 
"I t 1e relevant interpretive evidence [for construing treaties] was the actual, practical 'con- 
struction' of the treaty through the past actions of the executive branch," and"[ d]ecisions 
from the first half of the twentieth century did not accord deference to the mere legal 
opinion of the executive branch on the proper interpretation of a treaty."108 By the late 
twentieth century, however, the Court had "strayed far" from its original doctrines and was 
giving "great weight" to executive branch opinions.1119 Obviously, deferring to executive 
"opinions," as opposed to deferring to established executive branch practices worked out 
over longer periods of time, served to expand presidential power substantially by allowing 
new administrations more easily to overturn settled interpretations and practices. 
IOI Even though the Court frequently referred to the Charming Betsy canon, for example, it applied the 
principle differently at different times and sometimes simply ignored it. See Chapter 2, pp. 73-76; 
102 
Chapter 4, pp. 130-41; Chapter 12, pp. 393-401. 
103 Chapter 2, p. 65. 
104 
Chapter 3, p. 90. 
105 Chapter 10, p. 352. The Constitution gives Congress and the Senate substantial power over foreign relations, and as late as 
the 1930s courts were commonly involved in deciding issues related to the nation's foreign affairs. See, 
e.g., LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS: IN PARTICULAR OF THE RECOGNITION OF 
IOG FOREIGN POWERS (1933). 
Chapter 1, p. 17. Moreover, they continue, the "executive branch agreed that the judiciary had an 
107 
independent responsibility to decide treaty interpretation questions." Id. 
108 
Chapter 2, pp. 84-84; Chapter 6, pp. 217-18. 
109 Chapter 6, p. 217. Id. 
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All the chapters agree, moreover, that the Court's decisions in Curtiss-Wright and 
Belmont represented major turning points. The former seemed to free the President 
from constitutional restraints in foreign relations law, and the latter seemed to elevate sole 
executive agreements to the constitutional status of Senate-ratified treaties. Combined 
with other changes the authors describe, the chapters make clear that in the twentieth 
century the power of the President expanded enormously in foreign relations and moved 
the law far from the Founders' understandings.l!" 
Accepting the fact of pervasive change is a necessary step in forcing us to think anew 
about the nature of international law and its proper role in American law and government. 
Appeals to simplified ideas of "original intent" or "original understanding" seldom, if 
ever, capture either the complexities of the founding era or the realities of subsequent 
historical developments. Similarly, appeals to supposedly normative "traditions" are too 
often invocations of made-up standards confected from scattered shards of history and 
willful acts of imagination. Such concepts usually obscure our understanding of the 
past while consciously or unconsciously twisting it to support dubious or novel claims 
in the present. They thereby corrupt our efforts to discern whatever particular - and 
usually elusive - lessons the past might actually have to teach.111 In contrast, an honest 
recognition of both the complexity of the historical record and the reality of persistent 
change can provide a more reliable foundation for efforts to understand the present and 
to sustain the enterprise of adapting the principles of American law and government 
wisely to the demands of an evolving society and an increasingly globalized world. 
B. Sovereignty, Inherent Powers, and American Consiitutionalism 
Another persistent theme is the influence of the concept of sovereignty. International law 
made sovereignty the defining mark of the nation-state: complete independence from all 
other nations, freedom from obligation to any political superior, and absolute authority 
over its territory and citizens. That idea of sovereignty, however, fit uncomfortably with 
two basic principles of American constitutionalism: that the federal government is a 
government of limited and delegated powers and that American citizens have rights and 
liberties that are beyond the power of government to infringe.112 
In spite of the ill fit, the transformation of the United States in the post-Civil War 
decades gave the idea of sovereignty a special appeal. Northern victory created a newly 
!Ill Chapter 7, p. 242; Chapter 8, pp. 279-83; Chapter 6, pp. 217-23; White, subra note 12, at 109-10, 
148-49. Professor Stephan presents a more qualified view. See Chapter 10, pp. 331-38. 
111 See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 19, at 1306 (evolution of Treaty Clause jurisprudence and the development 
of executive agreements brought profound shifts from the original purpose of the clause; "the law simply 
developed over time in response to particular events and circumstances"). 
112 See, e.g., McC11/loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819). Tension between traditional principles and 
ideas of inherent sovereign powers was apparent, for example, in Late Corporation of the Churcli of Jes11s 
Christ of Latter-Dar Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1889), where the majority upheld congressional 
power as "an incident of national sovereignty," id. at 42, while three dissenters rejected that theory and 
insisted that the "power of Congress is delegated and not inherent, and is therefore limited." Id. at 67. 
Similarly, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), the majority relied on "an inherent 
and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation," id. at 711, to uphold the power of 
Congress to deport certain aliens, while three dissenters rejected the doctrine as inconsistent with the 
Constitution's principles of limited government. See id. at 737 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 757-58 
(Field, J., dissenting); id. at 762-63 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). 
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unified and vibrant nation, while explosive economic growth made the United States 
the world's most productive nation and generated unprecedented levels of wealth and 
power. Westward expansion filled the continent with "white" settlers and new States, 
while economic expansion pushed the nation's political and economic interests across 
the Pacific and on to the shores of Asia. Those developments spurred the nation to assert 
itself with increasing boldness in international affairs. At the same time, millions of eth- 
nically and religiously diverse immigrants from across the world poured into the country, 
unnerving the nation's dominant Anglo-Saxon Protestant population and exacerbating 
racial, ethnic, and religious tensions throughout the society. Those rapid and stunning 
changes combined to press a variety of new demands on the federal government - 
for overseas territorial acquisitions, ethnically based immigration restrictions, limitation 
or elimination of Native American treaty rights, and support for market penetration 
and control throughout the world, especially in the Western Hemisphere and the vast 
untapped regions of Asia. Satisfying those new demands often required the exercise of 
novel or expanded national pow.ers, and to many Americans it came to seem that the 
United States, as a truly sovereign nation, must necessarily possess whatever powers were 
needed to achieve those ends. 
The Court seemed to accept that logic.113 As Professors Lee and Sloss point out in 
Chapter 4, the Court "began to extrapolate common characteristics of inward sovereignty 
as a corollary to the vision of international law," and "proceeded from the idea that all 
sovereigns possess the same set of powers and rights in foreign relations to tli°e concept 
that there is a similar set of domestic powers inherent in what it means to be a sovereign 
state."114 Beginning in the 1870s the idea of inherent sovereign powers helped underwrite 
the expansion of federal authority in a variety of areas, including immigration, territorial 
governance, the law of governmental immunity, the limits of judicial jurisdiction, the 
plenary power of Congress over Indian tribes, and the power of the federal government - 
the President in particular - over foreign affairs.115 Upholding the authority of Congress 
to exclude aliens in 1892, for example, Justice Horace Gray invoked "an accepted 
111axim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in 
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within 
its dominions." 116 
113 Positivism dominated international law thinking when the Court began to address those new problems 
and confronted constitutional sources that offered uncertain support for responsive policies that enjoyed 
great popular support. For the most part, the Court upheld those policies. See ge11erally BARRY FRIEDMAN, 
THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED 
ll4 THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 
11 _ Chapter 4, p. 152. ' See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent i11 Sovereignty: Indians, A/ie11s, Territories, and the Nineteenth 
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. I (2002) [hereinafter Cleveland, 
Powers Inherent in Sovereignty]; Sarah H. Cleveland, The Plenary Power Background of Curtiss-Wright, 
I IG 70 COLO. L. REV. 1127 ( 1999). 
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); accord Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 
U.S. 698, 711 ( 1893) (right to deport noncitizens is "an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign 
and independent nation"); Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 447 (1884) (power to coin money 
"universally understood to belong to sovereignty"); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 206-07 ( 1882) 
("the supreme power in every state" creates immunity of sovereign from suit); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 
98 U.S. 403, 406 (1879) (eminent domain "requires no constitutional recognition; it is an attribute of 
sovereignty"). 
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While the Court continued to invoke such inherent powers reasoning in foreign affairs 
cases well into the twentieth century, 117 it began turning away from that reasoning in 
domestic law cases at the end of the nineteenth. That doctrinal bifurcation stemmed 
largely from the different political and institutional considerations that moved the Court 
in domestic and international cases, 118 and it inspired in domestic law cases the increasing 
use of an interpretive method that can be called "infusionary textualism" - the practice of 
justifying desired rights or powers by infusing them into specific constitutional provisions. 
That method would render inherent power reasoning unnecessary and banish it from 
orthodox constitutional thinking, first at the turn of the century in domestic law cases 
and then during the later twentieth century even in most areas of foreign affairs law. 
The initial decline of inherent power reasoning in domestic law cases was due largely to 
the sharp political conflicts that marked the decades after 1890. Then, Populists, Progres- 
sives, labor unions, social dissidents, academic legal scholars, and an emerging plaintiffs' 
personal injury bar all began charging the Court with pro-corporate biases and subjec- 
tive decision making. Under those concerted attacks, vague ideas of "inherent" powers 
and other non-textual grounds for constitutional rulings became intensely suspect. The 
Court's inherent power decisions after the Civil War had commonly involved the asser- 
. f ti 1 di f d I · d di t: · · l l'i hon o na iona power over is avore et 1111c groups an istant roreign possess10ns, 
and for that reason they had seemed relatively acceptable and uncontroversial, if not 
highly desirable. The Court's decisions beginning in the 1890s that addressed intensely 
contested domestic issues, however, inspired vigorous and widespread criticism. Quickly, 
the Justices came to realize that prudence dictated minimizing or abandoning inherent 
power reasoning in domestic law cases and resting their decisions instead on specific and 
well-established legal sources, above all on the Constitution itself.120 Indeed, insofar as 
117 The outstanding example is, of course, Curtiss-Wright. See also Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311-12 
(1915); Burnetv. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 396, 400, 405 (1932); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 
34 (1947). Professor Waters places the Court's final rejection of inherent powers in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 
U.S. 253 (1967). See Chapter 12, p. 412; Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 257 (holding that Congress possessed no 
powers "as an implied attribute of sovereignty"). 
118 The Court likely felt far more comfortable invoking ideas of sovereign and "inherent" national powers in 
foreign affairs cases. Such cases were much less likely to provoke sustained domestic disputes and more 
likely to rally Americans behind rhetoric that portrayed the United States in world affairs as a strong and 
respected nation fully equal in rights and powers to all others. While still a senator, Justice Sutherland 
embraced inherent powers reasoning in foreign affairs law and made the point clearly: "Why should any 
citizen of the great Republic, proud of its strength and glory, desire that his government should be inferior 
in power to any government?" George Sutherland, The Powers of the National Government, reprinted as 
S. Doc. No. 417, 6lst Cong., 2d Sess. at 7 (1910). 
119 The "inherent plenary power" doctrine "derived directly from late-nineteenth century judicial decisions 
addressing Indians, aliens, and territorial expansion," and the Court developed it "in a series of decision 
in these areas between 1886 and 191 O." Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty, supra note 115, at 7 · 
120 Senator Sutherland was one of the first anti-Progressives to recognize the clangers of inherent powers 
reasoning and to develop an elaborate and politically responsive theory to cabin its uses. In 1910 he 
maintained that such reasoning was proper only in addressing" external" issues where national power was 
complete and exclusive and that it did not apply to "internal" issues where the Tenth Amendment limited 
federal power. If not so cabined, he argued, inherent powers reasoning could trump the rights of the 
States and give Congress authority to pass the federal child labor bill as well as the power to regulate other 
domestic areas including manufacturing, master-servant law, and conditions of factory labor. Sutherland, 
supra note 118, at 10-12. On the Court, he continued to invoke the idea of inherent sovereign powers 
in foreign relations law, see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936), but 
rejected the idea with respect to domestic matters. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294-95 
(1936). 
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the Justices in their domestic law jurisprudence sought more commonly to limit than 
extend government authority, they were primed in that area to abandon the potentially 
dangerous theory of inherent sovereign powers and embrace in its place the far safer 
theory of limited and delegated powers. 
In that context, the Court abandoned "inherent powers" reasoning in domestic law 
cases and began the practice of justifying desired rights and powers by infusing them 
into specific constitutional provisions. Such infusionary textualism was obviously advan- 
tageous. It justified the desired rights and powers by providing them with a textual 
grounding in the Constitution, and it demonstrated that those rights and powers nei- 
ther arose from the personal views of the Justices nor contradicted the Constitution's 
fundamental principles of limited and delegated power. 
The technique was not entirely novel, 121 but in the late nineteenth century it drew 
strength from two more recently established practices. One was the Court's use of 
"general" law - the idea that there were basic principles of reason and morality that 
properly controlled human affairs in the absence of specific "local" rules - and its grad- 
ual expansion of that category to include most common law subjects as well as some 
areas of constitutional law. As the Justices grew increasingly comfortable giving ever wider 
scope to "general" law, they found it easy to incorporate the analogous principles of inter- 
national law into its realm, including ideas of sovereignty and "inherent powers."122 Such 
basic principles of "general" law, they believed, were surely consistent with the principles 
of the Constitution itself. By the 1890s, when the Justices confronted rising domestic 
challenges and sought firmer foundations for their domestic law decisions, they readily 
came to see those "general" principles as actually embedded in the textual provisions of 
the Constitution itself. 
The other practice that helped advance the development of infusionary textualism 
Was the Court's blending of inherent powers reasoning with more traditional text-based 
arguments by conceiving of them as alternate or interrelated grounds of decision.123 
In the Legal Tender Cases, 124 for example, which· Professors Lee and Sloss identify 
121 In Federalist No. 31 Hamilton suggested the desirability of expansive interpretations of national powers 
in terms that seemed similar to later ideas of inherent sovereign power. "A government ought to contain 
in itself every power requisite to the full accomplishment of the objects committed to its care, and to the 
complete execution of the trusts for which it is responsible, free from every other control but a regard to 
the public good and to the sense of the people." THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 190 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Edward Meade Earle eel., 1937). His subsequent interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
highlighted the potential elasticity of textualism, see Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion 
on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 98 
(Harold C. Syrett et al. eels., 1965) [hereinafter Hamilton, Bank Opinion], and the Court followed his 
lead in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). Early doctrines such as the "dormant" Commerce 
Clause, see Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245 (1829), and the doctrine of "non-self- 
executing" treaties, see Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829), found substantive powers and limitations 
in the Constitution - and, consequently, new authority in the federal judiciary - that had no warrant in 
122 
the document's text. 
See, e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 683 (1892) ("In this country, the question of international 
law must be determined in the first instance by the court, state or national, in which the suit is brought. 
If the suit is brought in a Circuit Court of the United States, it is one of those questions of general 
123 
jurisprudence which that court must decide for itself, uncontrolled by local decisions."). 
Chief Justice John Marshall had used the same technique when he held that the United States could 
create territorial courts either under its "general" powers of sovereignty or under the Territories Clause, 
124 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, S 3, cl. 2. See American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511, 546 (1828). 
79 U.S. 457 (1871). 
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as "one of the Court's earliest manifestations of inherent power reasoning,"125 Justice 
Joseph Bradley's concurrence invoked the principle of "inherent and implied powers" 
while noting that, in the event the principle "be not true," the "express authority" of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause - on which the majority had primarily relied - also 
justified the Court's decision.126 Similarly, when the Court began expanding the powers 
of the President, it did so by mixing vague principles of "international relations" and 
"the nature of the government under the Constitution" with ordinary statutory and 
constitutional grounds of decision.127 In a brash example of the calculated fusion of 
these distinct theories, Justice Edward White approved American territorial expansion 
on the ground that the federal government, like every other "sovereign nation," possessed 
"the full right to acquire territory" and that it did so "in virtue of its sovereignty, supreme 
within the sphere of its delegated power."128 His reasoning, in effect, made inherent and 
delegated powers synonymous.l/" 
In the tum-of-the-century decades, the Court resorted to infusionary textualism in a 
variety of controversial domestic areas. Most fundamental, in a series of cases in the 1890s 
it infused the content of its "general" constitutional law into the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The infusion allowed the Court to transform "general" 
constitutional law into truly "federal" constitutional law binding under the Supremacy 
Clause and authorizing federal control over such issues as takings, contractual freedom, 
the requirement of just compensation, the reasonableness of rate regulation, and "public 
purpose" limitations on the taxing power of States and municipalities.U" 
The Court also used infusionary techniques to deal with many narrower issues. Hans 
v. Louisiana131 infused into the Eleventh Amendment an expansive concept of state 
sovereign immunity that was inconsistent with the amendment's express terms, unsup- 
ported by the Court's pre-Civil War jurisprudence, and unjustified in terms of the 
sovereign immunity doctrines of international law.132 In re Debs 133 injected into sev- 
eral otherwise irrelevant constitutional provisions the principle that the federal courts 
125 Chapter 4, p. 153. 
126 Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 5 56 ( 1871) (Bradley, J., concurring). For similar reasoning, see Jui/liard 
v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 447 ( 1884) (holding the issuance of "greenbacks" constitutional). 
127 In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890). 
128 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 303 (1901) (White, J ., concurring). 
129 White explicitly declared that federal power had to be "derived expressly or by implication" from the 
Constitution, id. at 288, while nonetheless invoking an "inherent attribute" of sovereignty, id. at 300, and 
insisting that "our forefathers" created a government that "was endowed with those general powers to 
acquire territory which all independent governments in virtue of their sovereignty enjoyed." Id. at 302. 
The powers of sovereignty, therefore, were necessarily embedded in the text of the Constitution, "either 
in express terms or by lawful implication." Id. at 288. 
130 Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner - Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of General Constitu- 
tional Law, 74 TuL. L. REV. 1263 (2000); Michael G. Collins, October Tenn, 1896 - Embracing Due 
Process, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 71 (2001). 
131 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
132 See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on Law, Race, 
History, and "Federal Courts," 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927, 1934-44 (2003); Chapter 4, p. 160 (identifying the 
original Eleventh Amendment with the international law principle of sovereignty and arguing that Hans 
went well beyond what that concept would justify). Subsequently, the Court infused the term "admiralty" 
into the Eleventh Amendment in spite of the fact that its text extended its reach only to suits "in law or 
equity." See Ex parie New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921). 
m 158 U.S. 564 (1895). 
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possessed an equitable power to maintain interstate order by injunction, while Plessy v. 
Ferguson 134 empowered the States to establish legalized racial segregation by inserting the 
decisive qualification of "separate" into the Constitution's unqualified guarantee of "the 
equal protection of the laws." The Insular Cases infused the distinction between "incorpo- 
rated" and "unincorporated" territories into the Constitution, a distinction that paralleled 
Plessy's "separate but equal" doctrineiind served analogous racial goals.135 Another series 
of cases infused a substantive national lawmaking power over maritime matters into the 
admiralty jurisdiction conferred by Article III.136 A third series infused into the Com- 
merce Clause a new "unconstitutional conditions" limitation on the power of States to 
regulate out-of-state corporations.137 A fourth infused a new and substantially broadened 
doctrine of "field preemption" into the Supremacy Clause.138 A fifth infused substantive 
limits on state statutes and conflict of law rules into the Full Faith and Credit and Due 
Process Clauses.139 Most audacious of all, in 1907 Kansas v. Colorado 140 infused an 
exclusive national judicial lawmaking power over interstate disputes into - of all things - 
the Tenth Amendment.v" . 
By the time of World War I, then, the Court no longer felt any need to invoke ideas of 
sovereignty or "inherent" powers in domestic law cases. When rights or powers seemed 
necessary and desirable, it could simply infuse them into some constitutional provi- 
sion and thereby confer on them a textual foundation.142 Subsequent developments - 
including incorporation of the Bill of Rights, announcement of constitutional "privacy" 
rights, development of a "special" federal common law, and continuing expansions of 
executive power - proceeded by similar infusionary techniques.143 Once the method 
134 
135 
163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
13G See supra p, 297. Butler v. Boston & Savannah S.S. Co., 130 U.S. 527 (1889); S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); 
see Note, From [udicial Grant to Legislative Power: The Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67 
137 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1230-37 (1954). 
GERARD C. HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAw: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF JURISTIC PERSONS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW ch. 
8 (1918); see, e.g., Ludwig v. W. Union Tel. Co., 216 U.S. 146 (1910); Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 
138 
56 (1910); Harrison v. St. Louis & San Francisco R.R. Co., 232 U.S. 318 (1914). 
See, e.g., S. Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424 (1912); see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, 
JR., THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 1910-1921, at 270-75, 415-18 (1984); Stephen A. 
139 
Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 795-805 (1994). 
See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914); 
Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 ( 1915). Professor Ramsey notes the way 
14 
these cases replaced customary international law with domestic law sources. See Chapter 7, pp. 235-36. 
14~ 206 U.S. 46 (1907). See PURCELL, supra note 58, at 57-63. Brewer's theory in Kansas v, Colorado presumably responded to the 
positivist stricture that Holmes, struggling with the question of the Court's authority in interstate disputes, 
had announced the previous year: absent a controlling congressional statute, the "only ground" on which 
the Court could control a State was "one which must be implied from the words of the Constitution." 
142 
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 519 (1906); see Chapter 7, p. 230. 
Using reasoning similar to White's in Downes, Professor Alford shows how the "inherent" power and 
"external" sovereignty language of Curtiss-Wright can be given textual foundation by invoking Hamilton's 
theory of "resulting" powers. See Chapter 8, pp. 282-83. Similarly, Professor Stephan shows how the 
Court gradually came to locate stronger legal protections for aliens and for the status of citizenship in the 
143 
constitutional text. See Chapter 10, pp. 339-44. 
In this regard, the significance of Erie is that, in contrast to the Court's decisions in admiralty and interstate 
disputes, it cabined a major head of federal jurisdiction (diversity) with an anti-infusion principle. 
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was understood and its advantages recognized, it could be applied in any constitutional 
field.144 
Two critical doctrines illustrated the process. The power of the President to make 
international agreements that would be binding as domestic law without congres- 
sional authorization was initially identified as flowing from inherent "powers of external 
sovereignty."145 Subsequently, the Court explained that power as based on the provisions 
in Article II, Sections 2 and 3, authorizing the President to recognize and deal with 
foreign nations.146 Similarly, the doctrine of plenary congressional power over Native 
American tribes developed in the late nineteenth century, and the Court explained it as 
a power "inherent" in the nation's sovereignty. In the early twentieth century, however, it 
began suggesting textual bases for the power, referencing both the Territory Clause and 
the Indian Commerce Clause as its source.147 Eventually, it expressly rejected the inher- 
ent power rationale 148 while making it crystal clear that Congress nonetheless continued 
to hold the exact same plenary power that the nineteenth-century cases had upheld on 
grounds of "inherent" sovereign power. In l 989 the Court announced the completed 
infusion. Providing "Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian 
affairs," it declared, was the "central function of the Indian Commerce Clause."149 
The Court's recourse to inherent powers reasoning, as well as its subsequent use of 
infusionary textualism, further undermines the claim that in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries it was in thrall to a highly "formalist" and deductive jurisprudence. 
Its flexible, expansive, and innovative reasoning in both inherent power and textualist 
modes suggests, instead, that the Court was profoundly instrumentalist.P" It used sharp 
categories and deductive reasoning to be sure, but it shaped the categories and deployed 
the reasoning artfully to achieve the practical social, political, and institutional ends that 
its majorities sought.151 Rather than following some rigid logic of "essentialist" categories, 
144 Traces of the old inherent power idea remain in foreign affairs law, especially in immigration law. See 
Cleveland, Powers inherent i11 Sovereig11ty, supra note 115, at 158-63. lnfusiouary techniques, of course, 
could be used as easily to impose new limits on rights and powers as to expand them. For a series of 
opinions infusing into the words "enforce" and "appropriate" increasingly heavy and exacting substantive 
limitations on the power of Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see, e.g., City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bel. v. College Snv. 
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Bel. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). For an effort 
to infuse into the words an even more restrictive limitation on congressional power, see Nev. Dept. of 
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 741 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Kennedy, J.). Compare, 
e.g., Hamilton, Ba11k Opi11io11, supra note 121, at 102 (word "necessary" in the Necessary and Proper 
Clause means "no more than needful, requisite, incidental, useful, or co11ducive to"). 
145 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936); see Chapter 6, p. 220. 
146 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228-30 (1942). 
147 Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty, supra note 115, at 58-74, 78-81. 
148 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974). 
149 Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989). 
150 Professor Hollis identifies the "results oriented" nature of the Court's two different interpretive methods 
for construing treaties. See Chapter 2, pp. 81-83. 
151 Professor Cleveland suggests that the Court relied on inherent powers reasoning rather than the Com- 
merce Clause, which seemed the most obvious textual basis for congressional power in immigration 
cases, because it was unwilling, for domestic anti-legislative and pro-federalism reasons, to expand the 
scope of the commerce power. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty, supra note 115, at 269-71. 
Professor Alexander Aleinikoff suggests similarly that use of the Commerce Clause in immigration cases 
would have nudged the Court toward a higher degree of judicial supervision than Congress wanted or 
the Court wished to exercise. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 
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the Court was acutely sensitive to contemporary problems and needs, and it molded its 
jurisprudence to manage those problems and meet those needs.152 
While positivism in its international law form declined in the decades after The Paquete 
Habana153 and positivism as a general philosophy of law came under severe challenge 
after World War II, domestic law positivism survived and prospered in the form of a 
textualist convention. Most judges and commentators insisted that all legitimate power 
in the American legal and governmental system was derived from the specific text and 
structural provisions of the Constitution itself, and infusionary textualism saved that 
particular form of positivism by giving it the adaptability and creative potential necessary 
for its efficacy. 
C. Context and Congruence 
Although focused on the evolution of doctrine, the chapters in this book suggest a keen 
awareness of the broad historical.conditions that helped shape the Court's international 
law jurisprudence. There seems to be agreement, for example, that in the Republic's 
early years the Court was particularly sensitive to the rights and obligations of inter- 
national law because the new nation was relatively weak and dependent.154 Similarly, 
all scholars recognize the profound impact of World War II and its consequences on 
international law, especially the establishment of the United Nations and the subsequent 
development of human rights law. Most recently, the emergence of movements for gay 
rights, abolition of the death penalty, and vigorous use of the Alien Tort Statute155 have 
forced international law issues to the forefront of contemporary politics and generated 
sharp ideological disagreements on the Court. 
For the period from the late nineteenth century to World War II, the connection 
between broad historical forces and the Court's international law jurisprudence may 
not seem quite so obvious. The chapters in this period, however, point to a number of 
historical factors that influenced the Court's work, including the influence of positivism, 
the Spanish-American War and World War I, and the rapidly expanding power of the 
United States in world affairs. To those factors, at least two more should be added: first, 
the changing nature of international law itself and second, prevailing European and 
American attitudes about race and expansionism. 
AM. J. INT'L L. 862, 864 (1989). Assuming that such domestic concerns about the commerce power did 
push the Court toward adopting inherent powers reasoning, that fact further supports the proposition that 
the Court shaped its concepts not according to some essentialist logic but to serve the practical political 
152 
and social purposes the Justices shared. 
See, e.g., Harry N. Scheiber, Instrnmentalism and Property Rights: A Reconsideration of American 'Styles of 
ludicial Reasoning' in the Nineteenth Century, 1975 Wis. L. REV. l ; EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION 
AND INEQUALITI: FEDERAL DIVERSITI JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958, at 253-54, 394- 
153 96 nn.13-15 (1992). 
154 175, 677 ( 1900). 
Chapter 1, pp. 7, 44-46; see also Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 
42 VAND. L. REV. 819 (1989); Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law 
of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 792 (1952). For a qualifying view, see Douglas J. Sylvester, 
International Law as Sword or Shield? Early American Foreign Policy and the Law of Nations, 32 N.Y.U. 
J. INT'L L. & PoL. 1 (1999) (the early Republic used international law to compete commercially with 
15 5 
stronger European powers). 
28 U.S.C. S 1350. 
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As for international law, the late nineteenth century brought three interrelated develop- 
ments that gave the field new visibility and influence. One was political: the unifications 
of Italy and Germany in 1870, the consolidation of the European state system, and 
the subsequent rush among those states for territorial acquisitions and influence in Asia, 
Africa, and the Pacific. A second development was institutional: the appearance of codes, 
practices, scholarship, and organizations that gave the field of international law a new 
prestige and professional status. The proposed codes of Bluntschli and Field appeared 
in 1868 and 1872, respectively; the Treaty of Washington in 1871 paved the way for the 
widely noted Alabama Claims arbitration that was successfully concluded the following 
year; the Institute de Droit International held its first meeting in 1873; the Berlin West 
Africa Conference convened in 1884; and the First Hague Conference met in 1899.156 In 
the United States international lawyers and foreign policy experts began gathering annu- 
ally in 1895, and a decade later they established the American Society of International 
Law, with Elihu Root, the nation's Secretary of State, as its first president.157 Scholars in 
the field, the society's "Prospectus" declared in 1906, were establishing "the true princi- 
ples of international relations" and advancing "the science of International Law." 158 A 
third development was cultural and ideological: giving new prescriptive connotations to 
the traditional idea that international law was the law of "civilized" nations. Europe and 
the United States came to share a unifying belief that they quite authoritatively defined 
what it meant to be "civilized" and, consequently, that they could determine which 
countries around the globe met that standard and how "civilized" nations could seek 
to dominate and control the "uncivilized."159 The first development undergirded the 
burgeoning political, military, and cultural power of the modern industrialized nation- 
state; IGO the second provided the intellectual foundation for a new and assertedly more 
authoritative international law; and the third crowned Europe and the United States as 
the voices of that law and, implicitly, the arbiters of the legal rights of the rest of the 
world.161 
In the United States equally broad changes combined to make the new, profession- 
alized international law especially attractive. Rapid industrialization, urbanization, and 
150 See MARTI! KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAw, 1870-1960 ch. 1 (2001). 
157 See FREDERIC L. KlRGIS, THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw's FIRST CENTURY, 1906-2006 
ch. 1 (2006). 
158 The American Society of International Law, Prospectus, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 130, 131 ( 1907). 
159 "Outside the family of civilized nations ... the central purpose of international order was to promote 
the civilization of decadent, backward, savage or barbaric peoples." EDWARD KEENE, BEYOND THE 
ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: GROTIUS, COLONIALISM AND THE ORDER OF WORLD POLITICS 7 (2002); accord 
KoSKENNIEMI, supra note 156, ch. 2; ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAw ch. 2 (2004). This function of international law, while newly sharpened and more 
broadly utilized, was not new. See RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT ( 1999). 
IW It was at the encl of World War I when Max Weber defined the nation-state as the entity that possessed 
"the monopoly of the legitimate use of phrsical force within a given territory." Max Weber, Politics as a 
Voczmon, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SocIOLOGY 77-78 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eels., 1958) 
(emphasis in original). 
l(il GEtUUT W. GONG, THE STANDARD OF "C1v1LIZATION" IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 56 (1984). Under 
international law, for example, territory not in possession of a "civilized" state was available for occupation 
or conquest. See Cleveland, Powers Inherent ill Sovereignty, supra note 115, at 28-30 and sources cited 
in id. at 28 nn.13 5-36. 
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population growth expanded the nation's international interests and brought vigorous 
new efforts to penetrate foreign markets and influence world affairs.162 At the same time, 
the failure of Reconstruction, the political resurrection of the South, and the near-total 
eclipse of ideas of racial equality brought a resurgence of intense, pervasive, and often 
violent racism, while the de facto national reunion between North and South that marked 
the century's end sanctioned the racist upsurge and further stoked the fires of nation- 
alism. The nation's growing international assertiveness moved beyond familiar policies 
designed to expand foreign markets and prevent European intrusions into the Western 
Hemisphere and began to inspire more ambitious campaigns to ensure total hemispheric 
dominance, build and control a canal through the Isthmus of Panama, acquire strategi- 
cally located naval bases across the Pacific, and protect the nation's far-flung markets and 
expanding national interests by building - and if necessary using - a large and expensive 
modern navy. 
Those international and domestic developments proved highly interactive. On a social 
and political level, the United States - particularly its legal and professional elites - grew 
closer to Western Europe, most especially to England. Increasing numbers of Americans 
traveled abroad and established continuing international contacts, 163 while the United 
States and Great Britain buried the long-running resentments that had marked their rela- 
tions since the American Revolution and the War of 1812.164 Their statesmen gradually 
established a pivotal diplomatic rapprochement, and the elite bar in the United States - 
particularly influential in the conduct of foreign affairs165 - cultivated close personal 
and professional ties with its English counterpart.166 Those developments intensified 
America's sense of its European, and especially its English, roots, while England and 
Europe responded by accepting the United States as a "civilized" member of the "family 
of nations" and a major player in world affairs.167 
On an ideological and cultural level, nationalist and expansionist fervor unified the 
United States and Europe in their understanding of the proper bases of world order 
and highlighted the significance of their concept of'sovereignty. Further, a shared and 
pervasive racism combined with international law's fundamental concept of"civilization" 
to unite them behind legal and "scientific" race theories that justified their common, if 
often jealous and sharply conflicting, efforts to colonize or control vast regions of Asia, 
Africa, and the Pacific.168 Their shared cultural attitudes and common international 
IG2 IC.3 See, e.g., PAUL KENNEDY, TJ.m RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS 198-249 (1989). 
"The decades after 1860 witnessed a tenfold expansion in the volume of Americans sailing abroad." 
MICHAEL B. OREN, POWER, FAITH, AND FANTASY: AMERICA IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1776 TO THE PRESENT 
228 (2007); see also )AMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRES- 
IG4 SIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870-1920 (1986). 
"Imperialism played a major role in the great rapprochement." BRADFORD PERKINS, THE GREAT RAP- 
165 PROCHEMENT: ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES, 1895-1914, at 64 (1968). 
Between 1889 and 1945 every U.S. Secretary of State was a lawyer. Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. 
166 
Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100 AM.). INT'L L. 64, 65 (2006). 
See, e.g., DANIEL T. ROGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE (1998); 
RICHARD A. CosGROVE, OuR LADY THE Co MM ON LAw: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL COMMUNITY, 1870- 
167 1930 ( 1987). 
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There were also tensions, of course, especially a growing wariness about the power of Imperial Germany. 
Duncan Bell, Victorian Visions of Global Order: An Introduction, in VICTORIAN VISIONS OF GLOBAL 
ORDER: EMPIRE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT 10 
(Duncan Bell ed., 2007). 
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interests drove an even deeper wedge - religious, cultural, ethnic, and racial - between 
them and most of the other countries and peoples of the world.169 
Those complex developments nudged the Court's jurisprudence along two distinct 
but ideologically related lines. First, they helped inspire it to begin nationalizing and 
centralizing ever larger areas of American law and government. Second, they helped 
induce it to accept racist assumptions and approve racist policies in both its domestic 
and international law decisions. Indeed, it was the race issue that produced the most 
important exception to the Court's nationalizing thrust, for on that issue decentralization 
won the day in domestic law. That exception, however, only highlighted the political and 
ideological compatibility of the Court's domestic and international law decisions, for in 
both areas the Court's doctrines brought the same result: the nation's "white" majority 
was authorized to subordinate disfavored racial and ethnic groups. 
On the first trend, the Court began reshaping federal law to enhance the power 
of the national government and broaden the reach of its law.1711 Over the years from 
approximately 1890 to 1917 - always excepting racial matters - the Court expanded the 
powers of both Congress and the President, imposed constraining new legal limits on 
the States, and strengthened the federal judicial power to enable the national courts to 
exercise a tighter supervisory authority over the federal government and especially over 
state courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies.171 The Court's international law 
decisions reflected that same drive. Professor Ramsey tells us that the Court expanded 
the reach of federal judge-made law and began constitutionalizing such areas as personal 
jurisdiction and conflict oflaws.172 Professor Van Alstine argues that the Court adopted a 
"purposive approach to treaty interpretation designed, fundamentally, to advance amica- 
ble relations" with other nations.173 Such an approach reflected the Court's recognition 
of both the nation's growing involvement in world affairs and the desirability of a centrally 
controlled foreign policy. More particularly, Van Alstine maintains that the foundational 
precedents that underwrote the Court's sweeping interpretation of the treaty power in 
Missouri v. Holland were handed down in the same period: Ceofroy v. Riggs in 1890 
and both De Lima v. Bidwell174 and Neely v. Henkel in 1901.175 Most broadly, Professor 
Alford argues that the Court's international law decisions worked to support "assertions 
of government power."176 Thus, the Court's international and domestic law decisions 
Im See, e.g., PAUL R. SPICKARD, ALMOST ALL ALIENS: IMMIGRATION, RACE, AND CAPITALISM IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY AND IDENTITY (2007); PAUL A. KRAMER, THE BLOOD OF GOVERNMENT: RACE, EMPIRE, THE 
UNITED STATES, AND THE PHILIPPINES (2006); Kornel Chang, Circulating Race and Empire: Tra11s11atio11al 
Labor Activism and the Politics of A11ti-Asia11 Agitatio11 i11 the Anglo-American Pacific World, 1880-1910, 
96 J. Am. Hist. 678 (2009). 
170 The Court was also suspicious oflegislative power, and it sought in certain areas to check national and, 
most especially, state legislation. 
171 Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Ex parte Young and the Trunslormation of the Federal Courts, 1890-1917, 40 
TOLEDO L. REV. 931, 942-60 (2009). During the years from 1886 to 1910 the Court established the 
foundations of inherent powers doctrine in dealing with Native Americans, aliens, and federal territories. 
See Cleveland, Powers inherent i11 Sovereignty, supra note 115, at 7, I 0-11. 
172 Chapter 7, pp. 231-33 (admiralty); id., pp. 235-36 (personal jurisdiction and conflict oflaws). 
173 Chapter 6, p. 194. "Indeed, on the subject of treaty law, the period from 1901to1945 is among the most 
active ones in the Court's history." Id., p. 193. Professors Lee and Sloss find the Court using customary 
international law to shape treaties and statutes to serve the same purposes. See Chapter 4, pp. 130-33. 
174 182 U.S. I, 218 (1901) ("The treaty-making power is as much a constitutional power as the legislative or 
judicial powers. It is a supreme attribute of sovereignty."). 
175 Chapter 6, pp. 198-202. 
176 Chapter 8, p. 283. 
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were mutually supporting parts of its accelerating nationalization of American law and 
government.177 
On the second trend, the Court found the ideological underpinnings of international 
law welcome support for its decisions on domestic matters. Like most Americans, the 
Justices accepted and sometimes proclaimed racist ideas, and their racial attitudes helped 
shape their rulings on a number of domestic issues.178 In the 1870s they began to turn 
away from the freedmen and freedwomen, and in a series of cases over the next three 
decades they essentially scuttled both the constitutional and the statutory achievements 
of the Civil War and Reconstruction. 
The fundamental premise of international law - that it grew from "the acts and 
usages of civilized nations"179 - was entirely satisfactory to the turn-of-the-century 
Court, and it assumed apodictically that the United States, like England and West- 
ern Europe but unlike most of the rest of the world, was truly "civilized."180 Indeed, 
the Court frequently identified the United States as "civilized" as well as "European," 
"E 'nglish-speaking," and "Christian."181 All those terms carried well-recognized racial 
connotations.182 Through the concept of "civilization," Professor Cail Bederman has 
explained, "many Americans found a powerfully effective way to link male dominance 
to white supremacy."183 Indeed, in Dred Scott Chief Justice Roger Taney had invoked 
that same premise - that "civilization" had a racial foundation - when he declared that 
blacks were excluded from full citizenship by all "civilized nations."184 , 
In international law matters, the Court's decisions reflected those same attitudes.185 
Immigration cases, especially those involving Chinese and Japanese, revealed clear 
177 
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and sometimes quite overt racist views.186 So, too, did the cases dealing with Native 
Americans.187 Further, in the Insular Cases, Justice White enjoyed the seeming support 
of the majority for his statement that a treaty could not "incorporate an alien people 
into the United States without the express or implied approval of Congress."188 The 
danger of adding "alien people" to the Union, the Justices believed, should require the 
purposeful assent of the whole Congress, a requirement that made such incorporation 
exceptionally unlikely.189 Similarly, Professor Hollis notes the proliferation of treaties 
with non-European nations in the late nineteenth century and suggests insightfully that 
"pervasive racial prejudices" embedded in the distinction between "civilized" and "unciv- 
ilized" states "may explain why so many more non-European treaties proved inapplicable 
or unenforceable than their European counterparts." 1911 
Thus, in the turn-of-the-century decades international law merged with racism, expan- 
sionism, and American nationalism to generate a distinctive ideological formation that 
informed the policies of the turn-of-the-century Court. Its characteristic elements were 
well represented, for example, in the thinking of Robert E. Lansing, a prominent inter- 
national lawyer from New York who was a founding member of the American Society 
of International Law and later Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State.191 Writing on the 
theory of sovereignty in 1907, Lansing insisted that the Civil War had "nationalized" 
sovereignly in the United States and that the Union's "national character" could never 
thereafter be destroyed.1'!2 He believed that the federal government possessed total "exter- 
nal sovereignty" and that it was free to govern the nation's "colonial possessions" and 
colonial populations without constitutional limitation.193 Indeed, subsequently serving 
in the administration that introduced formal racial segregation in federal employment 
practices, Lansing was comfortable embracing the perspective of"the civilized world" and 
dismissing "the savage races of today."194 Finally, he approved the infusionary textualism 
the Court used to justify its nationalizing and centralizing decisions in both domestic 
general popular opinion, the political branches, state and local governments, and most white-controlled 
organizations and associations. 
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and foreign relations law. The "fixity" of written constitutions, Lansing explained, "fre- 
quently" caused difficulties "when new and unforeseen conditions" arose. In the United 
States, however, the problem of "fixity" had been "overcome by a liberal construction of 
~ertain provisions of the federal constitution." The Court had embraced "the theory that 
it was the original intention of its framers to provide for every contingency that could 
possibly arise and that the powers granted by the constitution are sufficient for every 
condition."195 The Court, in other words, had accepted the doctrine of sovereignty and 
the supervening claims of national necessity. 
The social, cultural, economic, and political conditions of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries underwrote those ideas in Lansing's mind as well as in the 
minds of a great many of his contemporaries. That context made international law a 
highly useful source of both inspiration and justification for the Court. 
V. Conclusion 
The chapters in this section highlight the variety, complexity, and adaptability of the 
Supreme Court's international law jurisprudence. They show on the one hand that the 
spare language of the Constitution and the uncertain nature of international law gave 
the Court substantial and sometimes virtually uncabined discretion in resolving the issues 
it faced and, on the other hand, that continually changing domestic conditions and the 
nation's shifting role in world affairs repeatedly induced it to reformulate and 'remold its 
doctrines. Neither the text of the Constitution nor the sources of international law wholly 
determined its course. Nor, of course, did any determinate original intent or understand- 
ing. Rather, by its best if imperfect lights the Court struggled to fulfill the twin - and 
sometimes tension-plagued-charges that its role imposed: an institutional duty to enforce 
the law and an institutional need to accommodate the dominant demands and perceived 
interests of the American people. Recognizing the nature of that tension and the complex 
considerations that shaped the Court's course leads to a deeper understanding of both its 
evolving international law jurisprudence and the nation's overall system of constitutional 
government. 
195 Lansing, supra note 193, at 311; see also id. ("The medium, by which this desirable and necessary elasticity 
has been obtained, is judicial interpretation."). 
